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Future wireless networks like mobile ad hoc networks and wireless mesh networks are expected to play important role in
demanding communications such as mission critical communications. MANETs are ideal for emergency cases where the
communication infrastructure has been completely destroyed and there is a need for quick set up of communications among the
rescue/emergency workers. In such emergency scenarios wireless mesh networks may be employed in a later phase for providing
advanced communications and services acting as a backbone network in the aﬀected area. Internetworking of both types of
future networks will provide a broad range of mission critical applications. While oﬀering many advantages, such as flexibility,
easy of deployment and low cost, MANETs and mesh networks face important security and resilience threats, especially for such
demanding applications. We introduce a family of key agreement methods based on weak to strong authentication associated with
several multiparty contributory key establishment methods. We examine the attributes of each key establishment method and how
each method can be better applied in diﬀerent scenarios. The proposed protocols support seamlessly both types of networks and
consider system and application requirements such as eﬃcient and secure internetworking, dynamicity of network topologies and
support of thin clients.
1. Introduction
Consider a disaster situation, such as an earthquake, a
flood, or a terrorist attack, where the commercial network
infrastructure is destroyed or out of order. The objective
of the rescue workers is to set up quickly, eﬃciently, and
easily a wireless network among them in order to help
in a coordinated way the aﬀected population. Their goal
is to interconnect all their computing and communication
devices, in a way that will enable them to share all necessary
information securely, in a way that they could be sure that
possible “high tech” terrorists/attackers in their range will
not be able to disrupt or intercept the rescue eﬀorts.
In real disaster scenarios, emergency response does not
take place all at once. We usually observe an escalation
in the presence of several groups of rescue workers and
prioritized escalation of their eﬀorts. In the beginning, we
usually observe ad hoc groups working as independent teams
that arrive at place independently. These teams gradually
become part of coordinated action by a central disaster
management entity, which requires more time to arrive at
place, set up its infrastructure, and become operational.
Approaching this scenario from a networking perspective,
a suﬃcient approach would be the support of the initial
groups of rescue workers by communication devices with
mobile ad hoc networking capabilities. In this respect, an
eﬃcient networking solution for the support of the central
disaster management entity would be the employment of
adaptive, self-organized networks with advances networking
capabilities, and redundant characteristics like wireless mesh
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Figure 1: Network model.
networks. Seamless interworking of both types of networks
would be a key requirement for such a scenario.
Security is a primary concern for providing protected
communications in such environments where there is no
available communication infrastructure and where networks
of varying types and sizes must be established quickly and
dynamically. Moreover, there might be situations where
potentially large numbers of rescue workers, potentially
from multiple government services or even nations must
cooperate and coordinate their eﬀorts in areas where natural
or man-originated disasters have damaged or set temporarily
out of order part or the entire telecommunication infras-
tructure. The unique nature and characteristics of mobile
ad hoc Networks and wireless mesh networks make them
ideal networking solution to the above situations. At the
same time, their nature and characteristics pose a number
of nontrivial challenges to their security design, architecture,
and services.
In both MANETs and wireless mesh networks, like in
any other type of network, trust cannot be created among
the network nodes without the existence of predefined
prior known information available to all nodes beforehand.
This special kind of information is necessary in order to
build trust between all participating nodes. A network is
established among the existing nodes, if from this preexisting
information known to all network nodes, we reach a state
where a common session key is agreed among the nodes.
The technical goal is to make sure that no other entity
outside the group should be able to gain access within the new
network. However, since neither a certification authority nor
a secure communication channel exists, potential attackers
have the ability to eavesdrop andmodify exchangedmessages
transmitted over the air. Additionally, since no central iden-
tification authority is present, group member impersonation
is easy, jeopardizing the security of the whole system.
Considering all these issues, the main challenge that
arises is the setting up of a wireless network where the
legitimate members of a group will be able to establish a
protected wireless network. Moreover, in the case where a
new node arrives at place, desiring to become a member
in an already established group, joining, without delaying
or even intercepting the existing group, is also challenging.
The case where a group member is captured by the enemy,
and therefore the group key is compromised is also part of
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the considered scenario. All the above considerations become
even more challenging for the mobile ad hoc/wireless mesh
internetworking scenario examined in this work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we describe the system model. In Section 3, we describe the
adversary model, and in Section 4, we present the security
requirements. In Section 5, we present a review of the related
work concerning two-party and multiparty key agreements,
and we give a brief introduction on weak to strong authenti-
cation and the elliptic curve theory. In Section 6, we describe
specific multiparty key agreement protocols and particularly,
the BCC, the FCC algorithms, and the tetrahedral approach
and examine their properties. Finally, in Section 7, we
conclude with suggestions for future work.
2. System/Network Model
In this section, we consider a system/network model as illus-
trated in Figure 1. It consists of both wireless mesh networks
and mobile ad hoc networks. While several detailed surveys
on mesh network architectures can be found in the literature
[1, 2], the proposed system model is the similar to the one
defined for the EU-MESH Project (http://www.eu-mesh.eu/)
as far as wireless mesh networking is concerned. Accordingly,
this model a mesh network consists of mesh routers that
form a network with very similar networking attributes and
characteristics of a static wireless ad hoc network. The mesh
routers can function either as gateways to the wired Internet,
or as wireless access points for mobile mesh clients.
We assume that the mesh routers belong to multiple
operators, and they cooperate for providing aggregate net-
working services to all of their mesh clients. In the disaster
management scenarios, we consider as diﬀerent operators
diﬀerent teams of rescue workers (firemen, policemen, etc.).
Their cooperation model, which falls out of the scope of this
paper, can be based on simple on field agreements or on
business agreements similar to roaming agreements in the
case of cellular networks. Mesh clients are mobile computing
devices (smart phones, PDAs, netbooks, etc.) operated by
customers that can be associated with one or more operators
by contractual means.
The mesh network provides various services to its clients
like Internet access, real-time communications within the
mesh network, and so forth. In this model, the mesh network
is also designed to provide QoS applications with client
mobility support. This way mobile mesh clients can perform
seamless handovers between access points.
In parallel to the wireless mesh architecture, in our
system model, we have the presence of independent mobile
ad hoc networks as shown in red in Figure 1. A MANET
is a type of network, which is typically composed of equal
mobile hosts that we call nodes. When the nodes are
located within the same radio range, they can communicate
directly with each other using wireless links. This direct
communication is employed in a distributed manner
without hierarchical control. The absence of hierarchical
structure introduces several problems, such as configuration
advertising, discovery, maintenance, as well as ad hoc
addressing, self-routing, and security [3].
In our internetworking model, a MANET node can be
also considered as a mesh client and can perform seamless
handovers between access points of the mesh network or
between the MANET and the mesh network.
3. Adversary Model
As usual, the first step in the identification of security re-
quirements is the understanding of the potential attacks
against the system. This understanding is summed up in
the following adversary model that describes the classes of
attackers, their objectives and their means to attack the
network.
Taking into account the system model of mobile ad hoc
and wireless mesh internetworking, the following types of
attackers are identified.
External Attackers. These are attackers that have no legiti-
mate access to the MANET or the wireless mesh network but
they have appropriate equipment to use the wireless medium
and interfere with the operation of the network protocols.
Compromised Nodes/Clients. These are legitimate node
devices that have legitimate access to the MANET and/or the
wireless mesh network services and they have been compro-
mised by attackers (e.g., by stealing a device or by capturing a
legitimate user in the field). The attackers have the knowledge
to modify the behavior of these nodes and try to take
advantage of this in order to interfere with the operation of
the network or to gain illegal access to its services.
Dishonest Network Nodes/Clients. They are misbehaving end
users that while they have legitimate access to the wireless
networks and some or all of the network services, they try to
take advantage of this in order to gain illegal access to services
that are not subscribed to, or to obtain higher QoS in services
that they are already subscribed.
Dishonest Network Operators. They are operators of the
mesh infrastructure that do not honestly keep to cooperation
agreements.
Next, we identify the followingmain objectives of attacks.
Denial-of-Service (DoS). The objective of this type of attack
is to degrade the QoS provided by the mesh network and/or
the MANET or even to completely disrupt the provided
services. This is an objective of external adversaries.
Unauthorized Access to Services. This objective is mainly
related to external adversaries and dishonest clients. Com-
mon services include internet access and real-time commu-
nications.
Unauthorized Access to Network Client Data and Meta-Data.
Network client data are the messages exchanged in a service
session and the corresponding objective is the violation of the
confidentiality of the client whereasmeta-data is information
related to the client’s location and service usage profile and
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the objective is the violation of the privacy of the client.
Primarily, this objective is related to external adversaries and
dishonest network operators.
Fraudulent Improvement of Operator Profile. This could
be the objective of dishonest operators that may mount
attacks on the mesh network or specific network opera-
tors/competitors participating in the network in order to
gain some advantage over them. This can be achieved either
by reducing or destroying the reputation of the competitors,
or by spuriously increasing their own reputation.
There is a broad range of attack mechanisms that can
be used and combined in order to reach the goals described
above. However, most of these mechanisms fall into either
one of the following two categories.
(i) attacks on wireless communications (including
eavesdropping, jamming, replay, and injection of
messages, and traﬃc analysis).
(ii) compromising existing nodes (typically by physical
tampering or logical break-in). The behavior of
the fake or compromised nodes can be arbitrarily
modified in order to help to achieve specific attack
objectives. In such a scenario, the underlying security
depends on the size and the randomness of the
chosen password. However, the larger the password
gets the more diﬃcult it is to memorize and use.
Moreover, since the response time is vital during
emergency operations, the use of large passwords can
be proved inconvenient. Therefore, the use of short,
user-friendly passwords is an essential requirement;
(iii) setting up fake mesh routers or compromising unat-
tended existing mesh routers.
4. Security Requirements
It is broadly known that security mechanisms cannot create
trust [4]. The members of a team that wish to establish a
group know and trust one another physically. Otherwise,
they would never be able to achieve mutual trust regardless
of the authentication mechanism used. Our goal is to exploit
the existing physical mutual trust and create a secure group
of communication for both types of networks that would
operate in a seamless manner.
An eﬃcient solution to this direction, without adding
new requirements like the use of dedicated hardware (i.e.,
smart cards), would be a password authentication mecha-
nism. A simple approach of a password-based authentication
scheme could be the use of suﬃciently large and randomly
generated data strings employed as passwords. In such a
scheme, all nodes could agree on a password and achieve
mutual authentication supported by a trivial authentication
protocol.
In such a scenario, the underlying security depends
on the size and the randomness of the chosen password.
However, the larger the password gets the more diﬃcult it
is to memorize and use. Moreover, since the response time is
vital during emergency operations, the use of large passwords
can be proved inconvenient. Therefore, the use of short, user-
friendly passwords is an essential requirement.
The use of short passwords provides weak authentication
since the password selection set is quite limited, and thus
the corresponding authentication procedure is vulnerable to
dictionary attacks [5]. Therefore, we need an authentication
protocol that will lead to a reasonable degree of security even
if the authentication procedure has been initiated from a
small, weak password.
Below, we outline the main security requirements of the
proposed architecture.
Weak-to-Strong Password-Based Authentication. Use of an
authentication scheme that will lead to a reasonable degree
of security although the authentication procedure has been
initiated from a small, weak password.
Secure Authentication. Only the entities that hold the correct
password will eventually become members of the network.
Forward Authentication. Even if a malicious partner man-
ages to compromise a network entity in a later phase, he will
still be unable to participate in the already existing network.
Contributory Key Establishment. The network is established
when a session key is generated and agreed among all net-
work nodes. The session key should be generated throughout
in a contributory manner, by all participating entities.
Security Architecture for Thin Clients. In both types of
networks, there are mobile devices/clients with limited pro-
cessing power and energy consumption. The cryptographic
algorithms used for authentication and key agreement
should add minimal computational overhead.
Rare Key Reestablishment. Session key refreshments should
be performed as rare as possible, since during every new key
reestablishment session the network is unavailable for node
communications.
Unified Security Architecture for Combined MANET-Mesh
Secure Internetworking. The proposed key agreement mech-
anisms should apply in both types of networks, without
requiring any network-specific adjustments.
5. Background Theory
5.1. Password-Based Key Exchange. Typical cryptographic
protocols based on keys chosen by the users, are weak to
password guessing attacks. Bellovin andMerritt [6] proposed
a protocol called Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) where a
strong shared key is derived from a weak one. The basic
concept of the generic protocol is the following: there are
two parties A, B that share a password P. Both parties use
a suitable symmetric cryptosystem but entity A has also the
ability to create a random asymmetric key pair, (eA,dA).
During the first step, A generates a random public key eA and
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encrypts it symmetrically using key P in order to produce
P(eA). Then, A sends it to B
A : (Aid,P(eA)) −→ B. (1)
This message includes A’s id in clear text.
Since A and B share the same password P, B decrypts
the received message to obtain eA. Node B generates a
random secret key R and encrypts it in both asymmetric and
symmetric cryptosystem using as an encryption key quantity
eA and P, respectively. So, B produces P(eA(R)) and sends it
to A
B : P(eA(R)) −→ A. (2)
Entity A now decrypts the received message to obtain R,
generates a unique challenge challengeA and encrypts it with
R to produce R(challengeA) and send it back to B,
A : R
(
challengeA
)
−→ B. (3)
Then, B decrypts the message to obtain A’s challenge,
generates a unique challenge B, and encrypts the two
challenges with the secret key R to obtain R(challengeA;
challengeB). Node B is ready to transmit quantity
R(challengeA; challengeB) to node A
B : R
(
challengeA; challengeB
)
−→ A. (4)
When A receives the message, it decrypts it to
obtain challengeA and challengeB, and it compares it
with the previous challenge. If there is a match, A
encrypts challengeB with R to obtain R(challengeB) and
sends it to B
A : R
(
challengeB
)
−→ B. (5)
If the challenge response protocol has been successfully
deployed, then the authentication process is successfully
accomplished and both parties proceed, using the symmetric
cryptosystem and the quantity R as the session key. However,
this protocol has a major drawback. That is, the creation of
the common session key R has taking place with unilateral
prospective, that is, only by the entity that first initiate the
whole procedure. Thus, the key agreement scheme is not
contributory.
In [7], Asokan and Ginzboorg proposed a contributory
version of the above protocol for both two party and
multiparty case. Their proposal is described as follows.
(1) Two-party case
(i) A → B : A,P(eA),
(ii) B → A : P(eA(R, SB)),
(iii) A → B : R(SA),
(iv) A → B : K(SA,H(SA, SB)),
(v) B → A : K(SB,H(SA, SB)),
where SA, SB are the random quantities generated from A, B,
respectively, and K is the session key produced according the
formula K = F1(SA, SB), where F1 is an one way function,
and H() is a public hash function.
(2) Multiparty case
(i) Mn → ALL : Mn,P(E),
(ii) Mi → Mn : Mi,P(E(Ri, Si)), i = 1, . . . ,n− 1,
(iii) Mn → Mi : Ri({Sj , j = 1, . . .n}), i = 1, . . . ,n− 1,
(iv) Mi → Mn : Mi,K(Si,H(S1, . . . , Sn)), forsomei,
where E is the Public key of Mn. Si, for all i is the random
quantities generated from Mi, and K is the session key
produced according the formula K = F2(Si), for all i. F2
is an n-input one way function and H() is a public hash
function.
5.2. Password-Based Diﬃe-Hellman Key Exchange
5.2.1. Two Party Key Exchange. Diﬃe-Hellman is the first
public key distribution protocol that opened new directions
in cryptography [8]. In this important key distribution
protocol, two entities A, B after having agreed on a prime
number p and a generator g of the multiplicative group
Zp, can generate a secret session key. In [6], Bellovin and
Merritt proposed a password authenticated key exchange
which operates in the following way.
(i) A picks a random number, RA calculates P(gRA(mod
p)), and A sends A, P(gRA) to B; entity A’s id is sent in
clear text.
(ii) B picks a random number RB and calculates
gRB (mod p). B uses the shared password P to decrypt
P(gRA mod p) and calculates
gRBRA mod p. (6)
(iii) The session key K is derived from this value by
selecting a certain number of bits. Finally, a random
challenge, challengeB is generated. Then, B transmits
P
(
gRB
(
mod p
))
,K
(
challengeB
)
. (7)
(iv) A uses P to decrypt P(gRB mod p). From this,
quantity K is calculated; K is in turn used to
decrypt K(challengeB). A then generates a random
challenge challengeA. A sends
K
(
challengeA, challengeB
)
. (8)
(v) B decrypts K(challengeA, challengeB), and verifies
that challengeB is correct. B sends
K
(
challengeA
)
. (9)
(vi) A decrypts to obtain challengeA and verifies that it
matches the original message.
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5.2.2. Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-Hellman. The original Diﬃe-
Hellman algorithm is based on the multiplicative group
modulo p. However, the elliptic curve Diﬃe-Hellman
(ECDH) protocol is based on the additive elliptic curve
group, and it is desribed below. We assume that two entities
A, B have selected the underlying field, GF(p) or GF(2k),
the elliptic curve E with parameters a, b, and the base point
P. The order of the base point P is equal to n. Also, we
ensure that the selected elliptic curve has a prime order,
in order to comply with the appropriate security standards
[9, 10].
At the end of the protocol, the communicating parties
end up with the same value K which represents a unique
point on the curve. A part of this value can be used as a
secret key to a secret-key encryption algorithm. We give a
brief description of the protocol.
(i) Entity A selects an integer,
dA : dA ∈ [2,n− 2]. (10)
(ii) Entity B selects an integer
dB : dB ∈ [2,n− 2]. (11)
(iii) A computes QA = dA × P. The pair QA,dA consists of
A’s public and private key.
(iv) B computes QB = dB × P. The pair QB,dB consists of
B’s public and private key.
(v) A sends QA to B
A : QA −→ B. (12)
(vi) B sends QB to A
B : QB −→ A. (13)
(vii) A computes
K = dA ×QB = dA × dB × P. (14)
(viii) B computes
K = dB ×QA = dB × dA × P. (15)
Quantity K is now the common shared key between A
and B. Moreover, it can also be used as a session key. Quantity
n is the order of the base point P.
5.2.3. Password-Based Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-Hellman. The eﬃ-
ciency of elliptic curves in terms of security and calculation
eﬃciency has been extensively discussed [10, 11, 12, 9a, 14].
Therefore, their employment in the password-based Diﬃe-
Hellman process would significantly accelerate the key estab-
lishment procedure. The importance of this enhancement
becomes even greater in the case of an emergency situation,
where all actions should be performed in the fastest and
more secure possible way consuming limited computing
power.
We assume there two entities A, B that have agreed on the
underlying field GF(p),GF(2p) on an elliptic curve E with
coeﬃcients α,β defined over the selected field, on the base
point Q and the password P. The operation of the proposed
protocol is as follows.
(i) A picks a random number RA : RA ∈ [2,n − 2],
where n is the order of the base pointQ and calculates
P(RA ×Q)A sends
P(RA ×Q) (16)
to B; entity A’s id is sent in clear.
(ii) B picks a random number RB : RB ∈ [2,n − 2] and
calculates RB × Q. B also uses the shared password P
to decrypt P(RA ×Q) and calculates
RB × RA ×Q. (17)
(iii) The session key K is derived from this value, perhaps
by selecting certain bits. Finally, a random challenge
challengeB is generated. B transmits
P(RB ×Q),K
(
challengeB
)
. (18)
(iv) A uses P to decrypt P(RB ×Q). From this, K is calcu-
lated; K is in turn used to decrypt K(challengeB). A
then generates its own random challenge challengeA.
A sends
K
(
challengeA, challengeB
)
. (19)
(v) B decrypts K(challengeA, challengeB) and verifies
that challengeB is correct. B sends
K
(
challengeA
)
. (20)
(vi) A decrypts to obtain challengeA and verifies that it
matches the original message.
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5.3. Eﬃcient D-H-Based Multiparty Key Exchange
5.3.1. d-Cube Protocol Overview. For key establishment
procedures in multiparty networks like MANETs and mesh
networks, where several entities are involved, multiparty
authentication protocols should be applied. A lot of research
has been done in this direction. Becker and Wille [15]
presented a method very eﬃcient in terms of number
of authentication rounds. According to this method, also
known as d-cube protocol, all entities planning to participate
in a network are initially arranged in a d-dimensional
hypercube. Each potential network entity is represented as a
vertex in the d dimensional-cube, and it is uniquely assigned
a d-bit address. The addresses are assigned in a way so that
two vertices connected along the ith dimension diﬀer only in
the ith bit. There are 2d vertices each of which are connected
to d other vertices.
5.3.2. DH d-Cube. Assume that there are n = 2d entities
seeking to establish an ad hoc non infrastructural network.
During the first step, each entity is assigned to a vertex
in the hypercube, and it is given a unique d-bit address.
The deployment of the address arrangement is out of the
scope of this paper and will not be examined. The key
establishment protocol is illustrated within d rounds. In
every single round the entities are paired together, according
to a specific procedure, and the Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange
is performed. These pairwise operations are performed in
parallel during every round. For example, during the ith
round of the protocol a node with address a performs a
two party Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange with the node whose
address is a⊕2i−1. So, in the ith round there will be 2i−1 pairs
of groups, each group consisting of 2d−i nodes. By the time
the dth is completed, a contributory session key will have
be created. Next, we will present graphically the 2-d and 3-
d cases.
In the 2-d case (d = 2 → 2d = 22 = 4), there
are four entities {A, B, C, and D} aiming to establish a
common session key. Let us assume that the address that
were assigned to them are {00, 01, 11, 10}, respectively.
Each entity contributes in order the common session key,
(Ksession = KABCD) can be created, so let us also assume
that the contribution of each entity is (SA, SB, SC , SD). During
the first round, two pairs will be created, pair1 consisting of
entities A, B and pair2 consisting of entities C, D. The two
pairs will be internally and in parallel perform a two party
Diﬃe-Hellman yielding a pair of common keys (KAB and
KCD) as shown in Figure 2.
During the second round, A will perform a two-party
Diﬃe-Hellman with the node C while node B a two-party
Diﬃe-Hellman with D. Each node will use the common key
computed during the previous round, (round 1), in order
to create, during the current round, (round 2), the resulting
common session key. So, by the end of the second round,
all nodes will be sharing the same contributory key (SABCD).
This is presented graphically in Figure 3.
In [7], the authors incorporate the password-based
authentication into the cube protocol. This is achieved
by using the four-move two-party password authenticated
A:00
SC C:10
SAC=g
SASC
SBB:01
SDD:11
SCD=g
SCSD
Round 1
Successful 2-party
key exchange
SA
Figure 2: Asokan’s 2-d cube round 1.
SAB A:00
SCD C:10
SABCD=g SABCD=g
SABSCD
SABB:01
SCDD:11
SABSCD
Round 2
Successful 2-party
key exchange
Figure 3: Asokan’s 2-d cube round 2.
Diﬃe-Hellman protocol for pairwise exchanges in each
round of the d-cube protocol.
The method is also applicable in the case where the
number of players is not a power of 2. The solution for this
case is given thought the use of the 2d octopus proposed
by Becker and Wille in [15]. This protocol manages to
optimize the number of rounds performed. More precisely
if the number of nodes n follows that 2d < n < 2d+1,
then the first 2d nodes act as the central controllers and the
remaining ones (n− 2d) are distributed among them as their
wards. The controllers execute a two-party Diﬃe-Hellman
with their ward, and then they are engaged in a d round
cube protocol using information gathered from the previous
stage. Finally, the derived key is distributed to the wards.
Another important aspect that [7] introduced is the way
that a node should behave when a two-party authentication
procedure has failed. They propose an algorithm according
which a node can select another potential partner until a
nonfaulty one is found. For a single node N in a random
round k, there are at most 2k−1 potential nodes and at most
2k−1 potential subrounds. Two basic requirements are set for
node N .
(i) N must not match two nodes to the same partner in
a given subround.
(ii) N must not select the same partner twice.
The work in [7] selects the closest partners before the
more distant ones, in terms of Euclidean distance between
the two corresponding address. The protocol depends on
the current round performed, however each round can be
consisted of several subrounds.A subround is executed when
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a two party key exchange with the appropriate partner node
cannot be established. The operation of a player during a
given subround is divided in
(i) computation and transmission of all outgoing mes-
sages,
(ii) reading of all waiting messages and state transition
accordingly.
The proposed algorithm is best illustrated through a
simple example which is depicted in Figures 4 and 5.
Every node has a three bit address {x, x, x} and a three bit
mask, and it is labeled from A to H. Its key contribution is
represented by the corresponding lowercase letter.
Labels next to the arrows indicate the nodes that have
already contributed, directly or indirectly, to the key. Suppose
that player G (with address 110) is unsuitable (unavailable or
does not know the password). In round 1, player H (111)
will initiate the procedure of selecting as a partner the node
whose address is 110 and mask 000.
The exchange attempt withG fails and themask is already
$000$. So, H does nothing in this round. In round 2, E
($100$) will start with $110$ as candidate address and 001
as mask. The first recursive call will try $110$ as candidate
address and $000$ as mask and will fail. The second recursive
call will try $111$ as candidate address and $000$ as mask
and will succeed. Similarly, in round 3 and Figure 4, node C
($010$) starts partner finding with $110$ as candidate. The
work in [7] also considers the case, where the total number
of nodes is not more than 2d, while the number of the faulty
nodes ism : 2k ≤ m ≤ 2k+1 for some 0 ≤ k ≤ d. The 2k−1 of
them are located in a single k-cube C1, and the rest of them
in a k-cube C2.
The number of subrounds required in rounds from k + 2
to d where k < d − 1 are at most m + 1 per round. This is
because in each of those rounds, there is always one subround
with m faulty partners. The same faulty node may select
using N each of the m faulty partners in sequence before
being able to complete its round exchange, thus resulting
m + 1 rounds. Since there is no other subcube with more
faults,m+1 is the maximum number of subrounds required.
In round k+1, the number of faulty players inC1, is 2k−1,
resulting that the maximum number of subrounds is 2k. So
the total number of subround for the first k + 1 rounds is
therefore
k∑
j=0
2 j = 2k+1 − 1. (21)
Thus, the total number of communication rounds
required to complete the exchange is 2k+1 − 1 + (d − k −
2)(m−1). This case incurs the maximum possible number of
subrounds in the worst case during round 1 to k + 1 round.
6. The Family of Key Agreement Protocols
In this section, we describe a family of key agreement
protocols initially employed only in MANETs and the way
that can be implemented in aMANET/mesh internetworking
system.
In the approach described in Section 5, the only way
to obtain a common session key when one or more nodes
depart from the established MANET is to start over the
algorithm from the very first step. Furthermore, there are
no intermediate session keys stored between nodes that are
still part of the network, which could be proven to be useful
for node-to-node communication, when global session key
is no longer valid due to network reform. Such approaches
tend to be suﬃcient in relatively stable networks, where
their topology does not change frequently. However, when
network topology dynamicity increases, creating new global
session keys very often is not the optimum solution.
The following algorithms propose eﬃcientmeans for cre-
ation and use of intermediary session keys at the same time
with the creation of the global network key, which can be
used both for subgroup communications and as intermediate
step for key refreshment of the global session key, without the
obligation to restart the group key agreement.
6.1. The Body-Centered Cubic (BCC) Algorithm. The body-
centered cubic algorithm [16] is a cryptographic key agree-
ment algorithm that initiates from a tree-arrangement of 3-
d cubes; it is based on the aggressive 3-d cube algorithm
and employs the body-centered cubic (BCC) structure for
the dynamic case. For simplicity purposes, in the rest of
the paper, each bond in 2-d or 3-d space corresponds to a
two-party password-based elliptic curve Diﬃe-Helman key
exchange, as described in Section 5.2.3.
6.1.1. Initial Node Arrangement. The proposed system is
based on the 3-d aggressive d-cube algorithm [17]. The initial
key agreement procedure depends on the number of ad
hoc nodes that wish to establish a MANET. We denote the
number of nodes as n. In contrast to [17], in the proposed
system, there is no need for d-dimension hyperspaces. The
maximum order is the 3-d space. Nodes of the network are
always arranged in the 3-d space, except the case that n ≤ 4
where we can use the 2-d plane. Therefore, when we have
a large number of nodes, they must be divided and arranged
in 3-d cubes that each contains eight nodes. Each cube selects
a leading node that will act as an intermediary between the
corresponding cube nodes and the rest of the ad hoc network.
The leading nodes constitute a new group; however, they
follow the same rules for initial arrangement, that is, they are
arranged in a new 3-d cube. In the case where the number of
leading nodes is greater than eight (i.e., the number of all ad
hoc nodes is greater than 64), they also need to elect leading
nodes in their group that will act as their representatives
to the ad hoc network. In such a case, the leading nodes
elect higher level leaders in a tree model according to [18].
We consider the latter case as an extreme case since from
a practical point of view typical ad hoc networks do not
exceed 64 nodes. Figure 6 shows an initial arrangement of a
32-node network. Nodes are arranged in four independent
cubes and each cube elects a leader (dashed annotation).
Node arrangement and addressing can be performed in any
way, as far as every simple-cube node has wireless connection
with the rest of the seven nodes of the corresponding cube.
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This requirement must be also fulfilled by the leading nodes
among themselves; therefore, it is an important criterion for
the selection of a leading node within a simple cube.
6.1.2. Initial (Static) Key Agreement. Next, after the initial 3-
d arrangement, BCC creates a common network key. In the
proposed system this is done in two steps.
During the first step, the leading nodes perform a 3-d
aggressive cube algorithm and they create a global session
key. In the second step, every group performs a 3-d aggressive
d-cube and establishes a simple-cube session key. During the
simple-cube key generation, the leading nodes transmit the
global session key that they have already established in step 1
to the remaining seven nodes of the group. After the second
step, every node has a contributory simple-cube session key
Kcube for the cube that is part of, and the global session key
of the entire network Kglobal.
In the first step, nodes (000) of cube a, (010) of cube b,
(100) of cube c, and (110) of cube d are elected as leading
nodes of the corresponding cubes. Since they are four, they
perform a 2-d aggressive algorithm, and they establish a
global session key Kglobal. If there are than four and equal
or less than eight 3-d cubes, their leaders should perform
a 3-d aggressive cube algorithm. In this case, the leading
nodes can use the first two digits of their addressees as a
2-d address for the 2-d aggressive algorithm, that is, (00),
(01), (10), and (11). If other nodes are elected as cube leaders
due to communication constraints, they should be addressed
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Figure 6: A BCC 4-cube example.
in a separate way than the one employed in their 3-d cube
(second addressing is required).
Once the global session key of a group Kglobal is estab-
lished the cubes perform a 3-d aggressive d-cube, and they
establish the simple-cube session key Kcube. The final step is
that each cube leader broadcasts the global key encrypted
with the simple-cube key to the rest of the cube members.
At the end of the protocol, every node has a simple-cube
session keyKcube for secure communications among nodes of
simple-cubes, and a global session key Kglobal, for the entire
group (mesh or MANET).
6.1.3. BCC for the Dynamic Case. Above, we described the
initial arrangement-addressing of nodes and the generation
of a global and of simple-cube session keys. These keys are
static, since if there is a need to add new nodes to the
network, the key generation procedure must be repeated.
Here, we describe an eﬃcient method for dynamic key
generation every time new nodes arrive to or depart from
our network. The proposed dynamic algorithm is based
on the body-centered cubic structure, and we call it BCC
algorithm.
The body-centered cubic (bcc) structure is a cube with
an additional node in the center. Figure 7(a) shows a
typical cube while Figure 7(b) depicts a body-centered cube.
If we consider the grid case, the bcc structure is a set
of bcc cubes. The BCC algorithm for dynamic changing
topologies is presented through two cases: addition of new
nodes to an established network and extraction of network
nodes.
Case 1 (Adding nodes to an established network). The BCC
algorithm operates in the following way: assume that a group
has been established as previously described. Assume that
one simple cube of this network is depicted in Figure 7(a).
At some point of time, seven new nodes arrive and request to
join the network. If the number of the new arriving nodes
m is a multiple of 8, that is, m mod (8) = 0, then in
groups of 8, they perform aggressive cube algorithms and
each group elects a leader that will contact leaders of new
groups and leaders from the established network in order
to create a new global session key. If m mod (8) /= 0, then
we will have k new groups of 8 nodes where k is the integer
part of m/8 and l the number of the remaining nodes where
0 < l = m mod (8) < 8 while the k groups of 8 nodes will
perform new aggressive cube algorithms, the remaining node
will attach to an existing cube of the network in the following
way.
The first four new nodes are assigned addresses that
correspond to the center of the existing cube the centers of
the right, upper, and front cubes as shown in Figure 7(c)
while the last three are assigned addresses that correspond
to the centers of the left, back, and down cubes as shown
in Figure 7(e). Keep in mind that the six neighboring cubes
do not exist as network cubes; they are used as geometrical
objects for demonstration purposes of the BCC algorithm.
The first four new nodes (the body-centered cubic node
and three central nodes of neighbor cubes) create a new
cube with four nodes of the preexisting network cube as
shown in Figure 7(d), and they perform a new aggressive
cube algorithm. The latter 3 new nodes together with the
body-centered cubic node (the node assigned to center of
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Figure 7: Body-centered cubic structure.
the existing cube of the network that has already participated
in the previous new aggressive cube), and the remaining
four nodes of the preexisting cube of the network perform
a second new aggressive cube algorithm as shown in Figures
7(e) and 7(f).
The preexisting network nodes are colored black while
the new arriving nodes are in gray color. Figure 8 demon-
strates the BCC algorithm and the process that initiates with
an existing network cube and concludes to two new cubes
that both have the central node (body-centered cubic node)
of the initial cube as common node.
Case 2 (Extracting nodes from an established network).
The process for extraction of nodes from an established
network (MANET or mesh) is similar to the addition of new
nodes to such a network. The remaining nodes of a simple
cube find close cubes and perform the BCC algorithm.
This process changes only the global session key of the
network, since according to BCC algorithm cube leaders
have to establish a new global key; however, the simple
cube session keys of the rest of the MANET cubes remain
unchanged. Figure 9 demonstrates the simple case where one
node leaves an established cube (node 100 of the left cube of
Figure 9(a)). The remaining seven nodes take place according
to the BCC algorithm at the centers of the geometrically
neighboring cubes of the right cube of Figure 9(a), as shown
in Figure 9(b). The BCC algorithm concludes with the
generation of two new cubes as shown in Figure 9(c).
6.2. The Face-Centered Cubic (FCC) Algorithm. The face-
centered cubic algorithm is shown in Figure 10. The first
8 nodes (or less) are arranged in a 3-d cube as shown in
the left side of Figure 3. They perform an aggressive 3-d
cube algorithm and obtain a common session key. The first
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Figure 8: Body-centered cubic algorithm.
6 nodes that will arrive in a later phase will be arranged in
the centers of the six faces of the cube as shown in the central
picture of Figure 3.
The 6 new nodes together, with nodes (010) and (101)
that contributed to the initial cube, create a new cube and
perform a new (second) aggressive 3-d cube algorithm. This
way the inner cube creates a second common session key.
After the setup of the second session, key nodes (010) and
(101) hold both session keys corresponding to both cubes.
This privilege makes nodes (010) and (101) leading nodes for
the established network since any communication between
black and grey nodes should pass through them. If we wish to
avoid this hierarchy in our network, during the set up of the
common session key within the inner cube, nodes (010) and
(101) propagate the common session key of the initial (black)
cube to the new nodes. This way the first session key can be
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Figure 9: Extracting nodes from an established MANET.
used by all nodes to communicate securely with each other,
while the second can be used for the secure communication
of the internal (grey) cube.
The addressing of the new nodes is shown in Figure 11.
We observe that the 2 old (black) nodes keep the same
address with the one they had during the setup of the
first session key. For the communication between nodes
belonging to diﬀerent cubes there is a separate metric (cube
number) declaring the cube that the node is belonging to.
In this example, black nodes are identified as cube 1 nodes,
grey nodes are identified as cube 2 nodes, and nodes (010)
and (101) have both identifiers since they belong to both
cubes.
In the hierarchical model, where every cube has its
independent session key, key refreshment due to departing
nodes is easy. As soon as a node is leaving the network, the
rest nodes of the common cube, perform a new aggressive
3-d cube algorithm and create a new session key. In case the
leaving node is belonging to two consecutive cubes, a new
aggressive 3-d cube algorithm is performed automatically to
both cubes.
In the case where the previous session keys belonging to
previous cubes are forwardly distributed to the next cubes,
the key renewal should be performed to all previous cubes.
This appears not to be a desired feature, since if there is
a departure in the last cube all previous stages/cubes will
be aﬀected. However, this can be also avoided if the set
up is a combination of the two solutions. Periodically the
key forwarding method is interrupted by the hierarchical
solution. This way, we create isolated groups of concatenated
cubes and any necessary key refreshment is bounded within
these groups.
6.3. The Tetrahedral Approach. In the tetrahedral approach
[19], in contrast to [16, 20] all intermediate two-party ECDH
keys are stored by each node. This way, when a global session
key has been created, every node in the d-dimensional cube
maintains also a list of all the two-party ECDH keys that has
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Figure 11: FCC algorithm: addressing of the new nodes.
created with every of her closest neighbors during the global
key generation.
In the BCC and FCC approaches as described above,
as soon as the initial phase of the proposed algorithm is
completed, each node posses the global session key, and the
two-party keys with her closest neighbors. At that point, if
a node leaves the network, the global session key should
be refreshed and in the meantime, secure communications
would be only available between couples of closest neighbors
that have already established two-party keys during the
creation of the latest session key, which is no longer valid.
This way, communication between distant neighbors, is
only available through multihopping between nodes that,
in couples, maintain valid two-party keys. This would
add another requirement for routing metric information
maintenance by all nodes, in order to serve each other
to find the right secure path in the network. Solution to
this direction is provided by the proposed integration of
tetrahedral group key agreement in the existing cubes. The
proposed structure covers both cases (d-cube and aggressive
d-cube) and takes place right after the creation of the global
session key.
Below, the procedure is explained in detail.
As soon as the global session key has been created
(round 3 in the 3-d example) all nodes establish two-party
ECDH with their second level closer neighbors. There nodes
are actually the ones based on the diagonal of each cubic
surface. The algorithm is better demonstrated in Figure 12.
Figure 12(a) describes the cube created after the global
key agreement, while Figures 12(b) and 12(c) demonstrate
the two-party ECDH key exchanges between the second
order neighbors. All these additional two-party ECDH key
exchanges form the two internal tetrahedrons inside the
cube as shown in Figures 12(b) and 12(c). Figure 13 depicts
the two internal tetrahedrons isolated by the cube. The
process for the establishment of these tetrahedrons, in terms
of two-party ECDH key agreements, is depicted in detail
in Figure 14. We can observe that two-party ECDH key
agreements take place on nonconnected segments. Although
that after the second round the tetrahedrons have formed
their global session keys, the algorithm has another final step,
by covering all available segments.
This is due to two reasons: every node has a two party key
with all nodes of the cube except the most distant node. For
example, a has two party keys with every node of the cube
except node h. Besides the group session keys among every 4
nodes forming a square edge of the cube, the four triangles
of each internal tetrahedron shares a common session key,
since the ECDH key exchange this time is the party D-H key
exchange instead of two-party in all other cases.
Let us provide an example to demonstrate the attributes
of the proposed algorithm. The reference node for this
example will be node a. During the initial 3-d or aggressive 3-
d algorithm, node a creates three two-party keys with nodes
b, c, and e and the global session key of the cube. During the
tetrahedral algorithm, node a creates three two-party keys
with nodes d, g and f. This way, node a maintains two-party
keys with all nodes of the cube except h.
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If any of its first and second order closest neighbor
leaves the network, during the global key renewal node a
will be still able to communicate with all expect one of the
remaining nodes. However, this distant node (in the example
node h) belongs to the other tetrahedron and has keys for
communication with the remaining nodes.
In another case, if a decides to leave the network, its
distant nodes, belonging to the left tetrahedron, do have
keys for secure communications (a session key for the hole
tetrahedron plus the two party keys among any pair of them),
while the remaining three nodes b, c, and h of the right
tetrahedron, besides the two-party keys, they have a three-
party key established among them during the last stage of
the tetrahedral key agreement algorithm. Therefore, when
a node leaves the network, the remaining nodes have all
the two-party session keys, a four-party session key of the
tetrahedron that did not change formation, and a three-party
session key of the triangle composed of the three remaining
nodes of the tetrahedron that the leaving node was part of.
6.4. Analysis of the Algorithms. All proposed algorithms inte-
grate elliptic curve cryptography together with the password-
based DH key exchange protocols and extend this approach
to the multiparty case where new network nodes arrive or
existing network nodes depart from the network.
The static multiparty case is considered and after careful
examination the aggressive d-cube algorithm is selected in
the 3-d case. The algorithms are extended versions of the
d-cube algorithm proposed in [7], with additional features
that enhance the resistance against the dictionary attacks [5].
The basic idea behind the algorithms’ design is to isolate the
faulty nodes in the earliest possible stage. We managed to
reduce the interaction with the faulty nodes and therefore
minimize the exposure to dictionary attacks and other types
of attacks. However, the aggressive behavior of the algorithm
may lead to isolation of even legitimate members due to
reasons such as the loss of commutation signal or the typo
errors of the initial password during the authentication
procedure. To overcome these kind of problems and to
provide a more dynamic and robust solution, we propose the
body-centered cubic (BCC) as well as the face-centered cubic
(FCC) and the tetrahedral algorithm.
The BCC and the FCC algorithms can be considered
as a series of diﬀerent aggressive cube algorithms, each
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one performs for a diﬀerent set of network nodes. In
terms of two-party ECDH procedures, the BCC and FCC
complexity is not higher than any of the single aggressive
cube algorithms. This is because within a single two-party
ECDH procedure of each algorithm, three ECDH procedures
run simultaneously, each one corresponding to a diﬀerent
round of the aggressive cube algorithm.
The tetrahedral algorithm has significant diﬀerences
compared with the BCC or the FCC algorithms. In this algo-
rithm, all intermediate two-party keys are stored locally by
the nodes and may be used during the network reformation
process. Moreover, three-party keys are stored, providing the
ability for secure subgroup communications among nodes
that share the corresponding keys.
Depending on the mobility pattern and the reformation
speed of the network, the aggressive d-cube algorithm is
more eﬃcient for almost static networks, the FCC approach
would be more convenient for small-medium network
reformation, BCC for medium-high network reformation
and the tetrahedral algorithm would better facilitate high
dynamicity in network reformation.
7. Conclusion
Our research was motivated by the need to establish fast,
reliable, eﬃcient, and secure group communications without
relying on preexisting infrastructures. The actual operational
environment and the varying nature of the established
networks impose further key issues (e.g., the ability to add
or subtract nodes depending on operational and security
considerations) that need to be taken into account.
We have reviewed existing proposals around two-party or
multiparty authentication and introduced new key establish-
ment methods. Our proposal overcomes some of the main
issues (such as rapid deployment, accuracy, and dynamic
and robust behaviour) of existing solutions and operational
environments. The proposed solutions introduce the use
of elliptic curve cryptography in such a scenario. ECC
computations require less storage, less power, less memory,
and less bandwidth than other systems. This allows imple-
mentation of cryptography in constrained platforms such as
wireless devices, handheld computers, smart cards, and thin-
clients. For a given security level, elliptic curve cryptography
raises computational speed and this is important in ad hoc
networks, where the majority of the clients have limited
resources.
The proposed algorithms meet all security requirements
according the initial specification and provide diﬀerentiated
solutions depending on the network reformation dynamicity.
They are designed to support in a uniform approach both
MANETs and wireless networks, taking into account a
broad range of application requirements including secure
internetworking and dynamicity of network topologies.
The proposed algorithms leave several open issues for
future work. Formal analysis is necessary. The incorporation
of several new password-based key agreement protocols,
which do not require the use of asymmetric encryption, is
a challenging consideration. Studying in detail the dynamic
case, where the network topology is rapidly changing,
would be very interesting, especially for indentifying the
thresholds of network reformation that should be employed
for algorithm switching.
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